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ABSTRACT

Our comparative business historical examination of industry associations aims to
enrich the under-theorized study of this distinctive type of meta-organization. We
compare two New Zealand industry associations operating in the same supply chain
but with differing degrees of associative capacity and types of external architecture.
Our analysis of these associations builds on two strands of theory that rarely
communicate with each other: new institutional economics (NIE) and organizationalinstitutional theory (OIT). We demonstrate how NIE describes the structural
potentialities for associational strength, while OIT addresses the relational context
within associations. In turn, NIE’s examination of external influences reinforces OIT
suggestions that associations which are rich in social capital can become
developmental in orientation. Our historical analysis supplies fresh theoretical insights
into industry associations, thereby addressing conceptual issues of interest to
management scholars who study bridging-type organizations. On this basis, we argue
that business history and organization studies complement each other.

Keywords: business history, industry associations, meta-organizations, organization
theory
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INTRODUCTION

It is time to move industry associations towards the forefront of research within
organization studies. They fit newly derived organizational categories that seek to
encapsulate large scale member-driven organizations, and display the hallmark
features of Ahrne and Brunsson’s (2008) ‘meta-organizations’ – organizations whose
constituent members are other organizations. To date, however, industry associations
have received scant attention from organizational researchers, even when they employ
germane categories. The ‘bridging organization’ is a case in point: although this
concept provides a useful shorthand description of the purpose and activities of
industry associations, theorists in this field have focused their attention elsewhere
(Brown, 1991; Lawrence and Hardy, 1999). Our article seeks to rectify this neglect by
using a comparative business history approach to identify the circumstances under
which associations serve as effective devices for inter-firm coordination and industry
development. We contribute to the management literature an enhanced theoretical
explanation of industry association effectiveness, but one that is grounded in finegrained historical analysis of the structure and activities of two associations: the New
Zealand Wool Brokers Association (NZWBA) and the New Zealand Port Employers
Association (NZPEA).
These associations share many similarities as service providers in the same
national supply chain. Their primary historical records, however, reveal that the
NZWBA was a successful vehicle for cooperation among its members, and for
industry development, whereas the NZPEA was unsuccessful. The divergent
experiences of two similar associations provide the opportunity to address why some
industry associations succeed as coordination and industry developmental
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mechanisms, while others fail at that task. A comprehensive explanation is not
available in the wider literature of industry associations, in large part due to
theoretical fragmentation. We seek to overcome this fragmentation by combining two
broad theoretical perspectives on industry associations: the New Institutional
Economics (NIE) and an eclectic perspective with roots in sociology and politics,
which we describe as Organizational-Institutional Theory (OIT). There have been few
attempts to integrate the insights of these perspectives for understanding industry
associations and the role they play in coordinating the activities of competing firms
and developing whole industries.
Proceeding from this theoretical foundation, our article illustrates how
business history and organization studies complement each other, first by providing
deeper understanding of a distinctive type of meta-organization, and second in
methodological terms. Unlike much management research, which seeks to clarify
causal relationships on the basis of abstractions from cross-sectional data, we use
comparative and counterfactual analysis to identify the necessary and sufficient
conditions for industry association success. Comparisons and counterfactual
reasoning are mainstays of the historian’s methodological repertoire (Mahoney and
Rueschemeyer, 2003; Weinryb, 2009). While the comparative method has a lengthy
history within organization studies (Etzioni, 1961), we show how combining this
method with robust counterfactual reasoning provides a powerful way of using
historical data for the purpose of organizational theorizing. By interweaving historical
and theoretical analysis with the aim of better understanding a prevalent bridging-type
organization, we address recent calls to fulfil Alfred Chandler’s legacy by reestablishing business history as a necessary complement to organization theory
(Kipping and Üsidken, 2008).
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In view of the gap in understanding the conditions for the success of industry
associations, we use the comparative and counterfactual methods to answer the
following questions. First, what are the determinants of the internal strength of
industry associations? Second, under what circumstances might strong industry
associations forego rent-seeking in order to promote industry and economic
development? We know that associations have the potential to foster industry selfregulation that enhances standards and builds capacity (Bennett, 2000; Streeck and
Kenworthy, 2005), but how is this potential realized? We derive answers by applying
to our case associations theoretical categories drawn from NIE and OIT, while using
the comparative and counterfactual methods to explain the performance differences
and thus to test and further refine these strands of theory. Two sets of findings emerge
from our analysis. First, a key determinant of an industry association’s internal
strength is its level of social capital, such that associability cannot be automatically
inferred from the association’s industry sector (cf. Traxler, 2007a). Second, an
association’s industry strengthening ability is a product both of its internal associative
capacity and the conditions it faces in its wider competitive, political and regulatory
environments. We show that the effects of this external environmental architecture are
subtly nuanced and frequently understated.
The next section presents the conceptual apparatus of NIE and OIT that
informs our work on industry associations. We then describe the benefits of our
historical research methods by situating our article at the intersection of business
history and organization studies. A third section introduces the two associations and
their historical settings, and investigates their internal organizational features and their
external influences and relationships. The concluding section shows how our
comparative historical analysis extends existing theoretical work on industry
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associations, and how the theory-building role of business history enhances
organization studies.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INDUSTRY ASSOCIATIONS

Understood as a ‘meta-organization’, an industry association is a third-party memberbased organization with a brokerage role, membership of which is voluntary, and
whose members retain their distinctive organizational identity (Ahrne and Brunsson,
2008, p. 3). The recency of the meta-organizations category, however, means that the
attendant conceptual apparatus is underdeveloped. Likewise, most bridging
organizations have the preceding characteristics (Westley and Vredenburg, 1991), but
bridging organization scholars and theories concentrate on community based activist
organizations and voluntary associations whose members are more diverse than the
profit-seeking firms that typically comprise an industry association (Brown, 1991;
Lawrence and Hardy, 1999; Geys and Murdoch, 2008). While recognizing the
relevance to industry associations of these overarching organizational categories, in
view of their conceptual and scope limitations, we put a layer of theory beneath them
by drawing on a wide-ranging literature that spans sociology, politics and institutional
economics.
Industry association theory is split between political and organizational
sociology, on the one hand (Coleman and Grant, 1988; Schmitter and Streeck, 1999;
Streeck and Kenworthy, 2005), the threads of which we draw together as the OIT
perspective, and New Institutional Economics (NIE) on the other (North 1990; Doner
and Schneider, 2000a). There have been few attempts to integrate NIE and OIT
(Schneiberg and Hollingsworth, 1991; Doner and Schneider, 2000b; Berk and
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Schneiberg, 2005). Scholars rarely use these perspectives in conjunction with each
other to explain the internal organizing challenges faced by industry associations, nor
to grasp the external effects of robust industry associations as industry strengtheners.
To the extent that our subsequent comparison of two associations combines the
insights of NIE and OIT, the purpose of this section is to demonstrate that they are
complementary, rather than competitive, perspectives on industry associations.

New Institutional Economics (NIE)
Following on from the pioneering work of Douglass C. North (North and Thomas,
1973; North, 1990), NIE scholars have consistently focused on institutional devices
that limit opportunism and reduce transaction costs. Recent work by Doner and
Schneider (2000a, 2000b) identified industry associations as a vehicle for mitigating
important sources of market imperfection that lie at the crux of NIE analysis (North,
1986; Williamson, 2000). In essence, they argue, associations facilitate exchange
through reducing transaction costs (by mediation and by improving information
flows), attenuate the need for hierarchy through mitigating agency problems (by
reducing information asymmetries), and promote cooperation through resolving
collective action dilemmas (by providing incentives). Their work provides a new line
of thinking in the NIE tradition since associations were an organizational form
previously neglected by such scholars. Moreover, they go on to address two central
questions to the study of industry associations: the structural design issues affecting
their associative capacity, and the circumstances under which associations go beyond
rent-seeking to facilitate wider improvements in economic and business performance.
High member density, or encompassment, they argue, is a central aspect of
associative capacity (Doner and Schneider, 2000b, p. 16). It enhances the
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association’s influence over the industry and its claim to speak representatively, and it
mitigates free riding by non-members or the emergence of a rival organization. Where
high density is achieved through a small number of members in a concentrated
industry, this reduces the costs of administering the association, particularly in
securing cooperation, participation, and honest behaviour. Conversely, where
membership is dominated by a few large organizations with their own substantial
resources and powerful internal bureaucracies, they may be less inclined to make a
major commitment to an association, believing the benefits accruing to be limited.
The most effective way to achieve encompassment is to make membership of
the association highly attractive. Olson (1965) described the tangible ‘selective
benefits’ that an association offers only to its members as club goods, such as shared
physical assets and enhanced transacting powers. Intangible selective benefits are also
prized, particularly the reputational signals that membership emits. In many cases,
membership is an explicit indication of trustworthiness and creditworthiness where
defaulters and bankrupts are expelled (Carnevali, 2004, p. 543). The ability of
associations to mediate business disputes among members can provide a more swift,
transparent, and low cost resolution than court orders. In turn, the existence of such
explicit and implicit signals strengthens the enforcement powers of associations,
expulsion being reputationally more damaging than non-membership.
While associative capacity explains how effectively an association can pursue
its aims, the nature of those aims is strongly conditioned by pressures in the external
environment. Given its emphasis on mechanisms that limit opportunism (Clague,
1997; Miller, 2005), NIE emphasizes external control and constraint as being the main
reason why industry associations may transcend rent-seeking imperatives and assume
a ‘market-complementing’ role (Doner and Schneider, 2000a, p. 263). Doner and
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Schneider (2000a, pp. 275-8) argue that ‘third-party enforcement’, particularly by
governments, transactors, and competitive international markets, will pressure
associations to become more efficient. Governments and associations often work
closely together, enabling the former to seek opinions and diffuse policy, and
providing the latter with an opportunity for lobbying. Governments have conferred on
associations various selective benefits, extending in some cases to compulsory
membership. This interaction has provided governments with opportunities to
pressure associations to seek improved economic performance in their sector of
influence in return for the privileges of association. The relationship also enables
governments to monitor more closely any rent-seeking activities. Enforcement can
come from other third parties associated with the industry, especially organizations
engaged in upstream and downstream activities that are eager to avoid incurring the
consequences of anticompetitive behavior while encouraging efficiency gains along
the value chain. Finally, as firms experience ‘market vulnerability’ during economic
downturns, they exert themselves to cut costs for their members. Increasing market
power is also much more difficult in such conditions.

Organizational-Institutional Theory (OIT)
The primary focus of NIE as far as the internal features of associations are concerned
is on the structural characteristics designed to reduce free-riding. Just as
institutionalism shifted the analysis of organizational structure in mainstream
organizational theory to social formations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1991),
OIT differs from NIE by focusing on the social processes underlying industry
association structure. OIT addresses the inherent ‘problem of associability’ when
membership is voluntary (Traxler, 2007a, p. 15), and how goal formation and the
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resulting character of the association are influenced by the socio-economic
background and micro-social interactions of members (Bennett, 2000). OIT also
singles out the State – or governments understood sociologically (Jessop, 2008) – as
the key external influence on associations (Coleman, 1985; Coleman and Grant, 1988;
Schmitter and Streeck, 1999). OIT changes the emphasis from ‘the government’,
construed in NIE terms as essentially ‘an institutional arrangement’ that defines and
enforces ‘property rights’ (North and Thomas, 1973, p. 97), to a sociologicallyinflected analysis of State influence and structures – including corporatism (Streeck
and Kenworthy, 2005).
OIT shows that the goals and objectives of industry associations are often
diverse and prone to change (Berk and Schneiberg, 2005), rather than being static or
predefined by the conditions of market failure. OIT is also amenable to sociological
insights concerning the influence of member orientation and commitment on
organizational focus and strength (Etzioni, 1961), and the importance to robust
member-based organizations of strong communal ties between members that generate
social capital (Coleman, 1988). OIT is therefore compatible with an eclectic mix of
approaches that focus on the social connectedness and embeddedness of actors in
economic and organizational settings (Grannovetter, 1985; Coleman, 1988; Walker et
al., 1997; Wenger, 1998). In line with embeddedness arguments, the recognition of
common interest is shaped by the micro-social embeddedness of industry association
members within a ‘relational setting’ (Somers, 1994, p. 626), which acts as a
repository of shared understandings. Commonalities in social and professional
background and aspirations of the members of the association may foster an innate
sense of cooperation (Grannovetter, 1985). These kinds of network-based social
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relationships promote association cohesion, to the extent that social capital functions
as ‘a means of enforcing norms of behaviour’ (Walker et al., 1997, p. 111).
OIT furthermore regards industry associations as having the capacity to move
beyond merely resolving the problems of market failure, to which NIE draws
attention, by providing new opportunities for industry and firm development through
reflexive organizational learning (Berk and Schneiberg, 2005; Rosenkopf and
Tushman, 1998). The key point of difference with NIE is the assumption that a
developmental or industry enhancement role by an association may occur in a
volitional manner, without being prompted or necessitated by forceful external
controls. Associations that take this role resemble ‘a community of mutual
engagement’ (Wenger, 1998, p. 126), they exhibit strong member self-discipline (van
Waarden, 1985; 1995), and possess the attendant capacity for industry selfgovernment (Streeck and Kenworthy, 2005, p. 455).
By extending the notion of governmentality to include both corporatism and
self-regulation, OIT provides an additional dimension to NIE’s emphasis on how the
market-complementing role of industry associations may be spurred by the
enforcement characteristics of government action. A key OIT insight is that
corporatist systems, in countries such as Australia and New Zealand with strong
‘state-licensed structures of interest intermediation’ (Traxler, 2007b, p. 5), have a
significant role in shaping the character and activities of industry associations
(Streeck and Kenworthy, 2005). Moreover, for OIT the relationship between industry
associations and governmentality is not exhausted by State regulation. Industry
associations may themselves assume a State-like role as a kind of ‘private
government’ that fosters behavioural self-regulation (Schmitter and Streeck, 1999, p.
57).
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Integrating NIE and OIT
Our comparative analysis of two New Zealand industry associations integrates the
respective insights of these perspectives. With regard to the internal strength of
industry associations, NIE highlights the organizational structural designs and
incentivizing and sanctioning devices that are intended to minimize collective action
dilemmas. OIT complements this view by providing insight into the social processes
behind the structural devices that militate against free-riding. Each perspective also
addresses the industry strengthening role of associations in a complementary manner.
While NIE points to the importance of external constraints in the adoption of this role,
OIT shows how an industry strengthening emphasis may also be projected upwards
from the grassroots level, based on communal social ties that establish trust and
shared expectations of behaviour among association members.

BUSINESS HISTORY METHODS AND ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY

Our approach to engaging business history with organization studies suggests that
each has strengths from which the other may benefit. How exactly business history
complements the study of organizations has been debated both by historians and
organizational analysts (Kieser, 1994; Clark and Rowlinson, 2004; Leblebici and
Shah, 2004; Kipping and Üsidken, 2008). The resulting roles into which business
history is cast range from subservience to near equivalence with organization theory,
as modes of inquiry into the structure, functioning and development of organizations
(Üsdiken and Kieser, 2004). The subservience role has, however, a tendency to win
out. How historians are trained makes them prone to leaving key theoretical
presuppositions implicit within their writing, as they ‘operate within an implicit
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paradigmatic framework that is shared by most of the practitioners of the discipline’
(Lloyd, 2008, p. 402.). Business historians are as guilty of pulling the blinds on theory
as social or labour historians. Any engagement between organization studies and
business history thus risks the latter being relegated, as Allport (1942, p. 55) might
say, to the status of a helpless empiricist tail to the theory-laden organization studies
kite. This is the classic ‘underlabourer’ role for a discipline (Winch, 1958, p. 3),
wherein historians merely supply the primary archive-based studies that organization
scholars then appropriate with a broader theoretical purpose in mind (e.g. Newton,
2004).
Mindful of Clark and Rowlinson’s (2004) warning to business historians about
the pitfalls of cramming history into essentialist organizational categories, we reject
the underlabourer view. Rather than subsuming historical approaches into
organization studies, we demonstrate that one important role for business historical
research is in circumstances where there are disparate or competing bodies of theory
that vie for the attention of organization scholars. Industry association theory is a case
in point. Simply stated, recourse to historical cases helps to overcome theoretical
fragmentation. Our comparative analysis illustrates how the insights of NIE and OIT
can be merged by applying modes of thought and analysis that business historians
regularly use, expertly but albeit often tacitly, in the analysis of primary materials.
The passage of time provided by the historical approach provides a sharper and more
complete focus for eliciting comparative differences, for counterfactual reasoning, the
specification of the conditions of necessity versus sufficiency, and an appreciation of
how organizing potential may be realized in practice. The separation in time of actors
from researchers means that archival research, unlike participatory contemporary
research, avoids obtruding on the behaviour of actors (Welch, 2000). In addition, it
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can provide access to sensitive and confidential information, the absence of which
conceals key motivations in much empirical research. Where there is rich extant
archival material it can provide ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1973), which is replete
with specific detail from a range of complementary sources.
Being able to chart the fortunes of organizations like NZWBA and NZPEA
over several decades, based on fine-grained analysis of their primary records,
provides rich qualitative data that has perspective. This is essential for the proper
analysis of counterfactuals (Hawthorne, 1991). Historically grounded counterfactual
analysis, in turn, helps researchers to distinguish conditions of necessity from
conditions of sufficiency (Tucker, 2009, p. 100). Combined with a detailed
comparison of the two associations, this method enables us to specify what makes
some industry associations effective and others ineffective. We show that ‘single
comparisons’ involving a pair of similar organizations, such as NZWBA and NZPEA,
do in fact ‘yield theoretical gains’ (Rueschemeyer, 2003, p. 306). The next section
specifies how our comparative business historical study provides a rich empirical
basis for an enhanced theoretical understanding of the activities of industry
associations.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TWO INDUSTRY ASSOCIATIONS

Our associations developed against the backdrop of a distinctive colonial heritage
shared by dominion societies (Ehrensaft and Armstrong, 1978). New Zealand’s
economic development since British settlement in the mid nineteenth century has
been founded on the export of staple commodities particularly wool, refrigerated dairy
products, and frozen meat. While the economy diversified into services and
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manufacturing in the course of the twentieth century, commodity exports remained at
the core of the nation’s economy (Hawke, 1985). A long and complex supply chain
has been required to move these commodities from the farm gate into the hands of the
overseas purchaser. Growing, financing, transporting, storing, selling and exporting
the annual wool clip, for example, was an enormous enterprise involving many actors:
graziers and farmers, shearers, stock and station agents, the railway companies, banks,
insurance companies, freight forwarders, wool brokers, wool buyers, stevedores, the
port authorities, carters, storemen and packers, shipping agents and shipping
companies. Money changed hands along this chain for services rendered. However,
these commercial transactions were not conducted at arm’s length between parties
who bought and sold solely on the basis of price. Rather they were relational
interactions embedded within a social and institutional substrate (Granovetter, 1985).
The commodity trades, in particular, depended on associations and institutions whose
role was to further the aims of the parties through negotiation and communication.
Firms, who were competitors at one level, formed associations that gave them a
collective voice in negotiating with other organizations and resolved issues within
their own industry.
Two of the key groups in the supply chain were the wool brokers, who
managed disposal of the wool at large centralized auctions, and the port employers,
who arranged for its delivery and safe stowage on board ship prior to its long sea
passage to foreign markets. Industry associations were formed by the leading firms in
both groups, the New Zealand Wool Brokers Association (NZWBA, formed in 1907)
and the New Zealand Port Employers Association (NZPEA, formed in 1949).
Industry associations as an institution are by their nature heterogeneous in size,
function, and location. Our two associations share many similarities particularly their
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location in the same agricultural commodity export chain, and in a sector that is
known to be highly suitable for comparative studies of industry associations due to
their prevalence and corporatist-style arrangement (Grant, 1987, pp. 4-5). Moreover,
they both functioned as service providers although the NZWBA served product
market interests and NZPEA labour market interests.
The records of both associations are held by New Zealand’s Alexander
Turnbull Library (hereafter ATL), which is part of the National Library of New
Zealand in Wellington. The richness of this archival evidence permits a close
comparative examination of their performance and an assessment against, and
reconciliation of, the differing theoretical standpoints identified in the previous
section. Our primary data includes minutes of meetings, correspondence, annual
reports, and associational rules and regulations, which provide the level of focus
required by business historical analysis. 1 We analyze the internal dynamics of the
associations, followed by their external industry effects.

Internal Organizing Challenges
Two key insights of NIE are that high member density is important to the ability of an
industry association to achieve internal organizational strength, and that the provision
of selective benefits limits opportunistic behaviour by members (Doner and
Schneider, 2000b). This section describes the level of encompassment and selective
benefits provided by each association. Counterfactual reasoning is then used to argue
that these are necessary but not sufficient conditions for creating internal
organizational cohesion and industry association strength. The latter depends, in
particular, on social capital formation and overcoming the erosive effects of spatial
distance on member control.
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Organizational Structure and Membership Composition
Both NZWBA and NZPEA were encompassing organizations that spanned their
respective industries as ‘comprehensive’ industry associations (Coleman and Grant,
1988). NZWBA’s membership consisted of the regional associations (see Figure 1),
which had come into existence in the late nineteenth century in response to the growth
of the local wool market. Most regional associations joined at the time of NZWBA’s
formation in 1907, although a few were added by 1911, persuaded by four years of
successful cooperation among the associations, and the achievement of measurable
progress in resolving issues with the New Zealand Wool Buyers Association. Seven
of the eight wool auction centers had regional associations that were NZWBA
members in 1911 and between them accounted for 98 percent of the wool auctioned in
New Zealand.2 Membership density remained high throughout its history, bolstering
its right to represent local brokers and gain access to government, thereby displaying a
‘logic of influence’ (Schmitter and Streeck, 1999, p. 19), while mitigating the risk of
free riding on its role as contributor to the public good. Applications for membership
went to an election, with rejection signified by the casting of three black balls.3 In
practice, there was no general attempt to limit entry, and fees were set at relatively
modest levels (ATL, MSY-4135, NZWBA Minute Book).
---------------------------------------------------INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
---------------------------------------------------The number of members remained comparatively small and stable, which
reduced the costs of administration and made it easier to gain cooperation on
decisions. A contraction in membership in the latter half of the twentieth century
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reflected the reduction in selling centers through amalgamation and rationalization in
the industry rather than reduced participation. 4 The membership of the regional
associations was similarly small, stable, and dense. It comprised the local woolbroking firms selling in the major centers (town members), and a country
membership, with reduced powers and status, for local stock-and-station agents, who
forwarded wool from smaller inland areas to the auction centers. Thus, in 1911 seven
associations representing thirty-three local brokers and selling agents were members
of NZWBA. The division between types of membership is indicated by the fact that
twenty-four of these thirty-three members were brokers selling at the major ports.
A group of wool brokers expanded nationally in the first few decades of the
twentieth century to dominate the industry. The top five brokered one-half of the wool
auctioned in New Zealand and developed national structures and policies: Dalgety,
New Zealand Loan and Mercantile Agency, Wright Stephenson, National Mortgage
and Agency, and Murray Roberts.5 Thus, the number of firms with a membership of
more than one regional association became an important factor in the cooperative
dynamics of the NZWBA. By 1911, 47 percent (twenty-four out of fifty-one) of
memberships of regional associations were held by firms with more than one such
membership nationally (ATL, MSY-4133, NZWBA Minutes, 1911). No firm, though,
individually dominated the wool-broking industry or its associations: 18 percent was
the maximum national market share held by any firm prior to major rationalization of
the industry in the 1960s. Nor did any of the regional associations control the
NZWBA: the maximum market share over the same period was 39 percent (Ville,
2000, p. 129). The absence of a dominant firm or association suggested that either
strong competitive rivalry would ensue or that leadership and direction might occur
through cooperation and mutuality of interest. While these firms were fiercely
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competitive with each other, they were operationally quite similar and shared many
interests and goals that could be furthered through cooperation.
Shortly after its formation, NZPEA also became an encompassing association
with high member density. Matching information from its confidential annual reports
during the 1950s, with official records of wages paid to waterfront workers, suggests
that more than 80 per cent of firms (over 50) involved in stevedoring were members
of the association. Despite NZPEA’s large and diverse membership, the industry was
relatively concentrated: calculated on a wages paid basis, four shipping companies
accounted for 62 per cent of employment in 1955 (Waterfront Industry Commission,
1956, pp. 48-51). Companies joined NZPEA at the national level, and in so doing
became members of local branches at the ports where they operated. Many small
firms engaged in stevedoring at a few ports or even just a single port, but a handful of
national shipping firms were members of several local branches. The resulting
organizational structure is depicted in Figure 2.

---------------------------------------------------INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
---------------------------------------------------In contrast to NZWBA, however, NZPEA was dominated by two sets of firms
with different interests: the four Conference Lines that had longstanding contracts
with New Zealand’s Producer Boards to ship highly seasonal primary product exports
to Britain (Shaw Savill and Albion, P&O’s New Zealand Shipping Company, the
Vestey family’s Blue Star line, and Port Line), and the numerous coastal shipping
companies that ferried general cargo between the country’s ports or to Australia.
These companies had their own associations, respectively the Overseas Shipowners
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Committee (OSC) and the New Zealand Shipowners Federation (NZSF), whose
members were represented on NZPEA’s Management Committee in equal
proportion.6 In 1955, the shipping companies that Management Committee members
represented accounted for 71 per cent of wages paid to waterside workers.
The cost of time in port was the key matter on which the interests of OSC and
NZSF differed. The coasters entered port more frequently than the deep-sea operators,
which meant that costs associated with vessels lying idle at berth – while waterfront
workers loaded and unloaded cargo – comprised a larger share of their total voyage
costs. As repeat users of waterfront labour at multiple ports, the Management
Committee’s NZSF representatives erred on the side of labour cost minimization. In
contrast, the Conference Lines were more susceptible to hold up at peak export times,
due to the problematic nature of transactions with labour or the harbour boards that
supplied equipment, and were quick to cede pay concessions in order to avoid
disruptive strike action.

Selective Benefits and Dispute Resolution
Membership of NZWBA and its constituent associations yielded significant benefits
for brokers. Firms participated in joint local selling, which generated scale economies
in physical infrastructure and marketing, particularly ownership of the saleroom,
shared administration of the auctions, and joint catalogues. Membership conveyed
participation in the national roster of sales, thereby avoiding clashes with other
regional auctions. Many of the objectives and outcomes of NZWBA were best or
solely captured through membership. These particularly included industry
representation, enhancement of the auction system, and regulation of the market.
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Active participation gave members a voice in these matters and in how the industry
addressed major shifts in the external environment.
Membership provided reputation guarantees for firms and associations. The
expulsion of members who repeatedly breached association rules or sale conditions or
were deemed guilty of ‘disgraceful or dishonourable conduct’, along with the
blacklisting of deviant transactional parties, helped to protect members from
opportunism. Graduated fines up to ₤50 and temporary suspensions distinguished the
minor or occasional offender from the recidivist, and helped to balance the potentially
conflicting aims of high membership density and effective enforcement. Through
such rules, therefore, membership signaled trustworthiness and creditworthiness to
other members and to other transactional parties, particularly growers and buyers. In
addition, they would have enhanced their reputations through professional activities
organized by, and associated with, NZWBA, such as setting standards and arranging
classes for wool sorting in local technical institutes (ATL, MSX-4323, Wellington
Woolbrokers Association Letterbook, 2/6/1910).
The most significant tangible selective benefit of NZPEA membership
stemmed from the New Zealand port system of collectivized resources, both human
(pooled labour) and physical (common-use wharves and cargo-handling equipment).
Queues of ships at the country’s ports were commonplace in the 1950s. Membership
allowed the different shipping interests to participate in a rostering system for
allocating each port’s government-administered labour pool and publicly-owned
berths. However, this selective benefit diminished in the mid-1960s due to external
environmental changes associated with technical progress, attendant shifts in the
stevedoring industry’s firm composition, and increasing labour militancy.
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Other services that NZPEA provided had the character of public goods from
which selective benefits could not be derived, thereby leaving the association more
exposed to free-riding. A prime example was NZPEA’s efforts to minimize wage
competition by negotiating with federated port unions a national labour relations
agreement, which set base rates and eliminated the need for spot contracting with
labour. NZPEA non-member firms could free-ride when employing waterside
workers, by using this agreement without directly contributing to the cost of its
negotiation.
For NZWBA, associational mediation of bilateral disputes between members
or representation in disputes with members of other associations reduced the cost and
time involved in resolution. NZWBA’s constitution contained instructions for dispute
resolution. Cases were heard at a general meeting, where the issue was resolved by a
majority vote of members (ATL, MSY-4135, NZWBA Rules and Regulations). The
process was standardized, and the members were well placed to judge matters that
were technical and specific to the trade. Under NZPEA’s rules, however, contested
proposals at the Management Committee could only be confirmed by means of
unanimous vote (ATL, 89-395-071, NZPEA Rules). The need to achieve unanimity
meant that contentious issues took months or even years to resolve. Agreement to
press the unions for shiftwork to extend the hours of port operation, which the
Conference Lines sought but coastal companies considered too expensive, took
almost three years to achieve (ATL, 89-395-203, 89-395-204, NZPEA Management
Committee Meetings 394, 396 and 408). While NZPEA had a modicum of success at
resolving differences of interest between the Conference Lines and coastal companies
over the priority use of labour and equipment, the coasters remained fundamentally
dissatisfied (ATL, 89-395-203, 89-395-204, NZPEA Management Committee

22

Meetings 314, 325 and 429). The Holm Shipping Company argued to a 1970 Royal
Commission of Inquiry that ‘charity begins at home’, and advocated the development
of a ‘standard code’ to allocate labour in favour of coastal ships (Museum of
Wellington, City and Sea, New Zealand Shipowners Federation Records, B/33/10,
3113/93, 106-108, Holm Shipping Company Limited to Royal Commission of Inquiry
into New Zealand Shipping, 27/10/1970).

Social Capital and Long-distance Control
Despite NZPEA being an encompassing association, the selective benefits it provided
were not sufficient by themselves to preclude opportunistic behaviour by firms, and
its mediation mechanisms could not overcome fundamental differences of member
interest that stemmed from large numbers and member heterogeneity. The
comparative case of NZWBA affords insight into the counterfactual. If NZPEA had
supplied greater selective benefits and been better at resolving disputes between
members, its cohesion would not have increased proportionately. The NZWBA case
shows that selective benefits and effective dispute resolution are necessary but not
sufficient for internal organizational strength – prerequisites of which include building
social capital among members to elicit trust-based relationships, and establishing
integration mechanisms that overcome the problem of ‘long-distance control’ (Law,
1986, p. 234) by compensating for any lack of geographical propinquity among
members.
NZWBA developed considerable social capital in relationships forged at the
regional level between member firms. Social networks and shared experiences
reinforced the attractions of membership. The occupational backgrounds of senior
managers, representing broking firms with the same heritage, were similar to one
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another.7 Regionally, many employees went to the same schools, participated in the
same social clubs, had worked as landowners and sheep farmers, and frequently
moved between firms (Ville, 2000, pp. 60-1; Stone, 1987, pp. 123-4; Christensen,
1986, p. 45). Such commonalities reinforced their desire to participate actively in the
associations, as shown by the records of high attendance at meetings, the almost
complete absence of threats of resignation, and an unwillingness to push divisive
issues and minority viewpoints. 8 NZWBA approximated a ‘closed network’ (Burt,
2002, p. 154), in which strong social ties between members elicited high levels of
normative commitment that militated against opportunistic behaviour and assisted
with the mediation of disputes between members. These social capital-based ties also
predisposed members to accept and submit to the Association’s rules. NZWBA’s
regional association members frequently met face-to-face in community settings and
the region-based representational structure, and its domination by a small group of
national firms, provided effective cross-regional communication and linkages that
overcame the geographical distance between members.
In contrast, NZPEA manifested much lower levels of cooperative behaviour
and had no effective solution to the problem of long-distance control. Members of the
Conference Lines and coastal companies were of different national origin (Britain and
New Zealand respectively), and the coasters were not above playing the nationalist
card – as Holm’s aforementioned ‘charity’ comment suggests. It was an association
afflicted by divergent sectionalist interests with little evidence of attempts to build
social capital among members. Resignation threats by members were not uncommon:
in 1965 Bob Owens, who built a transport conglomerate (The Owens Group) on the
basis of stevedoring profits at the Port of Tauranga, contemplated breaking away from
NZPEA to establish a separate association to represent newly emergent independent
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stevedoring companies (ATL, 89-395-203, NZPEA Management Committee Meeting
371).
The concomitant of NZPEA’s paucity of social capital was its difficulty
controlling the activities of member firms, which were scattered around more than 20
ports on New Zealand’s lengthy coastline. NZPEA’s port branches operated in line
with the wishes of firms at each port, frequently with little recourse to the national
Management Committee. Rules were openly flouted by members, particularly by
striking local deals with trade unions, and transgressors were rarely sanctioned.
NZPEA members and non-members alike sought to achieve labour cooperation either
by ‘purchasing’ consent, in the manner of the Conference Lines, or by following the
cue of coastal shipping companies that tolerated informal work practices. NZPEA’s
national officials frequently called for member firms to provide ‘a standard
application of [workplace] discipline’ (ATL, 89-395-202, NZPEA Annual General
Meeting, 10/10/1964), but trust within the Association was so low that the
Management Committee eventually resorted to costly monitoring through the
appointment of a ‘Travelling Inspector’ who motored between ports observing work
practices in an attempt to eliminate the member-tolerated informal practice of
‘spelling’ (ATL, 89-395-131, NZPEA Annual Report, 31/3/1973).9 NZPEA’s efforts
to influence the actions of its members ultimately failed because it had little control
over firms and their internal agents, the managers who brokered these side-deals.
Lack of social capital and member control increased NZPEA’s weakness in its
negotiations with labour organizations. Despite being a centralized organization, it
was unable to prevent union exploitation of member differences in relation to
transactions with labour. Weak ties and low levels of trust between members meant
that they failed to abide by the NZPEA’s rules, concerning the need for the
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Management Committee to authorize all local agreements (ATL, 89-395-071, NZPEA
Rules). The NZPEA’s representational structure did nothing to prevent opportunism
as member firms did direct deals with local unions to secure labour cooperation,
which had the effect of ‘bidding up’ labour rates above the national minima. As a
result, NZPEA’s Management Committee failed to limit wage drift (Reveley, 2003, p.
116).

Synthesis of Findings
NZWBA approximated a ‘high-involvement organization’ (Lawler, 1992), but for
NZPEA the level of member involvement was low. This level is not automatically and
unambiguously determined by how encompassing an industry association is, or by the
selective benefits that it provides – despite the primacy NIE affords to each of these
matters in accounting for association strength. Rather, high encompassment and the
provision of club-like benefits merely supply favourable background conditions
against which the fostering of normative commitment by members may occur.
Drawing on the OIT perspective, whether an industry association becomes a high
involvement – member-driven – organization is then determined by the extent to
which there is a congenial relational context, rich in social capital, for the construction
of shared understandings between members.

External Industry Effects
In accordance with the NIE view, NZWBA’s experience indicates the role of external
constraints in influencing the behaviour of associations away from mere rent-seeking
to promoting the broader interests of the industry and its economic setting. Of
particular importance as constraining institutions were the highly competitive
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international wool market, the wool buyers, and the State. However, their role
extended beyond constraining rent-seeking activity, as a simple interpretation of the
NIE literature might imply. Rather, when considered through the lens supplied by
OIT, cooperative behaviour elicited by these external components steered the
NZWBA in the direction of what Berk and Schneiberg (2005) call a developmental
learning association.
Many of the industry associations established in the late nineteenth century
were believed to have colluded in an effort to counter a period of economic downturn
and low profits. In Australia, for example, the Associated Northern Collieries was an
agreement between major mine owners dealing with prices and profits (Fleming and
Terwiel, 1999). This does not appear to have motivated the NZWBA. The fact that
price fixing was not revealed in their archives nor an ongoing issue in relations with
the buyers is perhaps unsurprising in light of the discipline imposed by a highly
competitive international wool market. In contrast to coal, there were large numbers
of wool producers. New Zealand’s share of the international wool market was less
than 10 percent, while a further 25 to 30 percent was sold at the neighbouring ports of
Australia (Abbott, 1998, p. 260). Wool also faced increasing competition from
synthetic fibres by the 1920s. Instead, brokers and their associations supported an
unfettered free market, and they were vocal in their opposition to post-World War II
government proposals for price or output controls. NZWBA focused its thinking
about the wool market towards shifting the point of sale from London to New
Zealand. It acted as a powerful advocate of local auction selling in the face of
opposition from London importing houses and brokers and, locally, from some of the
British and Australasian banks with substantial interests in the London market.
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NZWBA encouraged its members to sell locally with a view to establishing the scale
of activity necessary to compete with the long-established London market.
One of NZWBA’s key relationships was with the New Zealand Wool Buyers
Association. As the representative body of wool buyers, they naturally maintained a
watching brief over any attempts by the brokers to manipulate prices or volumes to
the benefit of sellers. What is interesting about the evidence contained in NZWBA
correspondence with the buyers association is the almost complete lack of discussion
of, or concern about, market manipulation. Instead, the focus was on cooperative
ways of building a more efficient auction system that would compete with the long
established London market. Far from seeing a national representative of brokers as a
threat, the buyers encouraged the formation of NZWBA as a sovereign governance
structure that could serve as an effective communications channel for improving the
operation of the wool market (ATL, 96-223-01, NZWBA Correspondence,
8/11/1911). Developmental achievements through inter-associational cooperation
centered on agreed practices that were codified in documents as routines. For
example, a ‘conditions of sale’ document set rules on matters such as the conduct of
the sale, the process for delivery of wool to the seller, and the point at which legal and
insurance responsibility shifted from seller to buyer (ATL, 96-223-09, NZWBA
Miscellaneous Papers; ATL, MSX-4323, Wellington Woolbrokers Association
Letterbook, 19/7/1909).
Another external constraint was the State, a key factor to which OIT draws
attention (Streeck and Kenworthy, 2005). Close networks and channels of
communication existed between the broking industry and successive governments,
particularly as a consequence of political representation and socio-economic
propinquity. As a result, State actors treated the NZWBA as a ‘private interest
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government’ (Grant, 1987, p. 12) that managed the affairs of the industry and
regulated the behaviour of its players. Where direct involvement occurred it was as
much intended to address issues of mutual interest, such as through the exchange of
information and expertise, as to impose discipline. Contact with the State was at its
most intense during and immediately after the two world wars, when NZWBA played
a key role in organizing the wool monopsony of the Imperial Government and in the
orderly postwar disposal of large surpluses.
NZPEA’s external environment was markedly different from that of NZWBA.
While the wool brokers competed in an international wool market, port services
constitute a derived demand that is specific to the trade patterns of a particular
locality. Therefore, at most, competition occurred among ports in a locality or
nationally in some cases. Competitive rivalry was further dampened by the cartel-like
operation of the four British Conference Lines. Firm heterogeneity produced the main
external constraint, manifest in the split between the Conference Lines and coastal
shipping companies that resulted from their different level of ability to absorb
increased port labour costs. Cooperative behaviour was hindered by this cleft, and
arguments between the two sets of members arising from their different priorities in
the payment, allocation and use of labour are abundantly evident in NZPEA
Management Committee minutes (ATL, 89-395-202, NZPEA Management
Committee Meetings 297, 314 and 325).
A contrast with NZWBA is also observable in relations with transacting
partners. Relations between the shipping companies in NZPEA as buyers of labour
services, and the labour unions representing the sellers of labour services, were often
fraught. NZPEA struggled to deal with growing union militancy, prompting eminent
labour jurist Judge Archer’s complaint that ‘port employers…consistently give way in
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the face of a threat of strike action’ (ATL, 92-305-01, New Zealand Waterfront Union
Workers Records, Reference to Minutes of Harbour Boards Conference, 16/3/1966).
NZPEA’s failure to stem wage drift meant it was unlikely to be built into a
developmental association. Without the stabilizing effects of such an association,
corruption flourished at ports to the point where a ‘Pillaging Committee’ was
established in 1974. This was intended primarily to represent shippers and legal
authorities, in an effort to halt the theft of cargo from the ships’ holds by port workers
– whose opportunistic behaviours occurred while under the employ and supervision of
many NZPEA member firms (ATL, 89-395-133, Pillaging).
Given these failings it is understandable that NZPEA, in contrast with
NZWBA, was not granted private government rights to manage and regulate the
industry. Its lack of internal cohesion and poor relations with other transactors made it
an inappropriate organization to play that role since it was not well placed to provide
direction through reflexive learning and interaction among its own members and with
unionists. By the early 1970s relationships with union representatives had decayed to
the point where NZPEA described them as ‘extend[ing] very little cooperation and
do[ing] little or nothing to achieve a harmonious working relationship’ (ATL, 89-395131, NZPEA Annual Report, 31/3/1973). NZPEA’s lack of cohesiveness led to the
capture of rents by stronger industry stakeholders, namely the port unions and their
federated association (the Waterside Workers Federation). In turn, this inability to
maintain stability in its transactions with key stakeholders affected NZPEA’s ability
to work with State representatives in a developmental role. This ultimately led to the
deregulation of the industry in the 1980s, and the collapse of NZPEA (Reveley,
2008).
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When juxtaposed, the comparative cases of NZPEA and NZWBA show that
internal associative capacity and external relations, in combination, determined the
industry strengthening capabilities of these associations. Whether an association
becomes developmental depends on its ability to manifest learning and adaptive
efficiency, by using past experience and changing environments to modify and
improve routines. The historical passage of time enables us to make some judgements
here. NZWBA proved to be an adaptable organization that learned from experience
and modified its behavior as new situations arose. Across its history, there are many
examples of NZWBA’s learning and adaptation. The impact of war and postwar
congestion on the length of the ‘prompt’ (the allowable time period from sale to
onboard delivery) was handled much more expeditiously during and after World War
II because it had learned from the drawn-out discussions that had taken place during
World War I. Similarly, the national roster required significant amendments over
time, which included extending the selling season and organizing separate North and
South Island rosters to mitigate private sales and avert congestion. Procedures for
monitoring sensitive activities, such as weighing and completing accounts of sales,
were enhanced and more clearly specified over time (ATL, MSX-4323, Wellington
Woolbrokers Association Letterbook, 17/12/1914). NZWBA’s ability to modify its
behavior in line with shifts in the external environment is best indicated by its record
of changing its role as wartime gave way to depression and, later, to postwar
expansion. Most obviously, the center of its attention shifted from dealing with the
wool buyers in peacetime to working closely with the New Zealand and British
governments in wartime.
NZPEA’s post-World War II performance was very different, because it was
not an adaptive institution. It exhibited little adaptive efficiency to the industrial
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change that occurred apace, in the late 1960s, as containerization fundamentally
altered stevedoring operations (Levinson, 2006). It took the NZPEA until 1976, more
than a decade after divisions between members stemming from the emergence of new
types of stevedoring firms was flagged at Management Committee meetings, to
achieve a resolution that it should reconstitute itself (ATL, 89-395-205, NZPEA
Management Committee Meeting 634). In the absence of effective organizational
learning about how to deal with cross-cutting cleavages among NZPEA members,
increasing member heterogeneity after containerization further reduced the
opportunities for coordination.

Synthesis of Findings
Combining the NIE focus on external factors that limit rent-seeking with the OIT
emphasis on developmentalism and learning enables a richer view of the importance
of an association’s external constraints. These constraints may be weak and hence fail
to prevent rent-seeking within an industry (as in the case of NZPEA), strong enough
to inhibit rent-seeking, or strong and cooperative wherein the focus shifts beyond the
prevention of rent-seeking to industry developmentalism (as in the case of NZWBA).
Within NZPEA, rent-seeking occurred in the absence of strong external constraints,
while for NZWBA developmental opportunities were exploited to develop a highly
successful alternative to the London wool market. The ability of NZWBA to manifest
both strong associative capacity and respond developmentally to external influences
shows that internal strength need not foster an inward-looking culture. Rather, its
associative capacity was consistent with seeking external ideas and solutions.
NZWBA’s achievements demonstrate that forceful external controls, such as external
regulation, are not a necessary prerequisite for shifting an industry association
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towards an industry development role. The contrasting NZPEA case nonetheless
suggests that a purely volitional shift in a developmental direction is unlikely to occur
without external conditions that nudge associations in this direction.

CONCLUSION

Following Chandler’s (1977; 1990) pioneering lead, business historians are wellplaced to contribute meaningfully to organization studies if they help to theorize key
facets of organizations. Our comparative study of industry associations fulfils this
goal of theory augmentation on two counts. First, it has done so by showing how
business history can be used to merge different traditions – such as NIE and OIT – in
areas of interest to organization scholars where the existing theoretical literature is
fragmented or underdeveloped. Understanding an industry association as a distinctive
type of meta-organization, one whose primary purpose is interorganizational bridging,
draws attention to its role in connecting diverse members. Bridging-type
organizations in general and industry associations, in particular, must make links
between socially and spatially differentiated actors, harmonize their different values,
and engage with powerful external agencies (Lawrence and Hardy, 1999). Using NIE
and OIT, we have framed these tensions, respectively, as problems that industry
associations face in maintaining long-distance control, building social capital, and
establishing private government rights. Our efforts to re-theorize industry associations
suggest, therefore, that there is merit in broadening the bridging organization concept,
beyond its origins in understanding community activism (Brown, 1991), to encompass
how firms build bridges and connect with one another through meta-organizations.
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Second, our comparative business historical analysis augments organization
theory by answering outstanding questions about the determinants of internal
organizational strength and the wider industry development role of industry
associations. Expressed in terms of a classic philosophical distinction, we have
combined NIE and OIT concepts to explain how the internal organizing
‘potentialities’ of industry associations are converted into actualities (Melchert, 1995,
p. 615). In counterfactual terms, NIE highlights necessary ‘background conditions’
for the formation of industry association cohesiveness (Tucker, 2009, p. 100), namely
congenial structure and the provision of extensive selective benefits and mediation
services for members. The NIE concept of associative capacity connotes potentials,
that is, whereas OIT explains how these potentials are realized through the medium of
social capital that fosters trust between members of the association, commitment to its
goals, and the desire to abide by its rules. Thus, the provision of selective goods is
necessary but not sufficient for an internally strong industry association. Internal
strength depends on an association having a high level of social capital. The different
levels of social capital found in NZWBA and NZPEA are instructive since an existing
literature suggests that labour market associations ‘tend to be less divisive’ than
product market associations (Traxler, 2007a, p. 24). Our comparative analysis reveals
the opposite to be the case: NZWBA (a product market association) was replete with
social capital and proved highly successful and enduring, while NZPEA (a labour
market association) lacked social capital and was plagued by divisiveness leading to
its ultimate demise. This finding suggests that levels of associability cannot be
directly inferred from the industry sector location of associations.
We have also spelt out the conditions under which industry associations might
assume an industry development role. This role does not emerge in a straightforward

34

way from an association’s internal cohesiveness and level of social capital, but also
from the kinds of relationships in its external environment that NIE understands as
militating against rent-seeking. Our evidence on three external constituents, namely
competitors, transactors, and the State, points to a situation where constraints mattered
but their impact was more wide-ranging than merely inhibiting rent-seeking
behaviour. The interactions with these three institutions enhanced the developmental
properties of NZWBA. We have shown that its internal strength enabled this
association to move towards an industry-enhancing role. Moreover, we have built on
that insight by showing that the reorientation of such an association towards a more
developmental role drew upon its external architecture, that is, its relationships with
key constraining institutions, as well as its organic internal properties. Once again, the
business historian’s counterfactual reasoning plays an important role in teasing out
these effects. Absent felicitous environmental conditions, there is no guarantee that
NZPEA would have achieved a comparable developmental role even if it had been as
internally coherent and rich in social capital as NZWBA.
While business historians have no monopoly on counterfactual or comparative
analysis, we have certain advantages in using these methods. Applying them through
fine-grained analysis of rich historical data helps to develop theoretically and
empirically grounded propositions about the development and activities of
organizations, such as industry associations, that have not featured widely in
organizational research. Counterfactual reasoning provides a different way of
identifying casual relationships than the correlational approach that is prevalent in
much normative management theorizing. Rather than looking for empirical
regularities in cross-sectional data, our in-depth comparison of two historical cases
has permitted us to highlight the background conditions (provision of selective
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goods), and then to specify the sufficient conditions (existence of social capital) for
the success of an industry association. Sufficient conditions can be construed as
causes (Tucker, 2009, p. 100), so we regard social capital as a cause of NZWBA’s
success, and its absence a cause of NZPEA’s failure. The role of external institutions
could be stated in a similar way, but there is a wider point that flows from our
analysis. To the extent that these theoretically informed causal attributions are novel
findings, the type of business history research from which they derive is a vital
steppingstone to establishing generalizable propositions about the properties of
industry associations. Thus demonstrated, the methodological benefits of business
history mean that it should not be cast in a ‘supplementarist’ role (Üsdiken and
Kieser, 2004), as the poor empiricist cousin of organization theory. Our article
hopefully helps to put business history on a par with organization studies as a
theoretically generative form of inquiry, rather than an underlabourer discipline.
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FIGURES

Figure 1. New Zealand Wool-Broking Association Organizational Structure
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Figure 2. New Zealand Port Employers Association Organizational Structure

NZPEA

Elected Management Committee

NZPEA Members – shipping firms
& stevedoring firms

NZPEA Local Branch
(Port level)

NZPEA Local Branch
(Port level)

Elected Branch Committee,
Chairman, and Branch Secretary

46

NZPEA Local Branch
(Port level)

NOTES

1

Alexander Turnbull Library archival sources: New Zealand Wool Brokers Association MS-

Group-0489 (MSY-4120, MSY-4133, MSY-4135, MSY-4133-4141, MSX-4323, MSX-4330, 96-22301, 96-223-09); New Zealand Port Employers Association MS-89-395 (071, 073, 131, 133, 202, 203,
204, 205); New Zealand Waterfront Union Workers Records, MS-92-305-01. Museum of Wellington,
City and Sea archival source: New Zealand Shipowners Federation Records, B/33/10, 3113/93, 106108.
2

The following wool-brokers’ associations were members by 1911: Auckland, Christchurch,

Dunedin, Gisborne, Napier, Timaru, and Wellington.
3

In a ballot a black ball vote by an existing member meant that they opposed the applicant.

4

Details of membership were recorded regularly in NWBA’s minute books, which cover

1907–84 (MSX-4330, MSY-4133-4141).
5

In some years, Pyne Gould Guinness had a larger share than Murray Roberts.

6

In 1957 the Committee comprised one representative each from the four Conference Lines,

two representatives of P&O’s Union Steam Ship Company (the largest coastal shipping company), and
one representative each from two smaller coastal shipping companies (Anchor Shipping and
Richardson and Company).
7

Similar attributes have been identified in the Scottish woollen knitwear industry (Porac et al.

1989, pp. 404-5).
8

In 1914, for example, the Wellington Woolbrokers Association (WWA) backed down over

the issue of bank rebates in the interests of associational unity (ATL, MSY 4120, WWA Minute Book).
9

‘Spelling’ entailed waterside workers taking an unauthorized period of rest during paid

working hours.
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